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Abstract
I construct a model of a dynamic economy in which the government
collects taxes and injects them into banks’ capitals for stabilization of
financial system. In theoretical part, I derive loan demand and supply
functions from dynamic optimizing problems of households and banks.
Carrying out a simulation, I show that the injection improves welfare
in some first periods, although it rather aggravates in the long term. I
also show that the injection induces efficient investments in some first
periods, while, it induces inefficient investments in the long term.
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1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to evaluate the effects of public funds injection
into private banks. In Japan, to mitigate a systemic risk, huge amounts of
public funds were injected in 1998 and 1999, and currently there is a heated
dispute over whether to inject them or not. The discussion of public funds
injection so far often focuses on moral hazard problem of a bank manager
(see Osano, 2001).
Another problem of the injection, which has not been focused on so far,
is who bears its cost. This paper considers this unheeded cost and assumes
it is financed by taxes. The actual injection in Japan was carried out by
borrowing 7.5 trillion yen (63 billion dollar) from the Bank of Japan and
the private financial institutions, and investing in the preferred stocks and
subordinated debentures which the recipient banks newly issued1. Seem-
ingly, people do not have any burdens. However, this is not true because
the government fully guarantees its debts. If the preferred stocks or subor-
dinated debentures become valueless by the failures of the recipient banks,
those losses will be compensated by taxes.
The injection may also increase bank lendings and lower a lending rate
of interest. This happens because the injected public funds can be used
for the lendings and a blip of the bank’s capital ratio, the ratio of capitals
to assets, lowers its credit cost under the Basel Accord. Figure 1 implies
this is actually the case: when the public funds were injected in 1999, the
lending attitude of financial institutions in Japan were greatly improved for
accommodative.
To analyze how these effects influence the macroeconomy through time, I
construct a model of a dynamic economy in which the government collects
taxes and injects them into banks’ capitals as a financial system stabiliza-
1The breakdown of the borrowed money was as follows: about 1.2 trillion yen (10
billion dollar) from the Bank of Japan, and about 6.3 trillion yen (53 billion dollar) from
the private financial institutions.
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tion measure. Since it is too difficult to solve analytically the influences
of the public funds injection on the economy, I carry out a simulation by
using the theoretical model and the empirically-known parameters. From
this simulation, it is shown that the injection improves welfare in some first
periods; however, it rather aggravates in the long term. It is also shown
that the injection induces efficient investments in some first periods, while,
it induces inefficient investments in the long term.
To the best of our knowledge, there are few studies on public funds injection
into banks. Kobayashi(2002) makes a survey of financial system stabiliza-
tion measures, including public funds injection. Osano(2001) studies the
optimal scheme of injection to prevent a bank from taking moral hazard
action.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 derives the
borrowing-demand function and the bank’s loan-supply function. Section
3 analyzes the effects of the tax-financed public funds injections into banks.
Section 4 carries out the simulation. Section 5 concludes.
2 The model
2.1 The household production
Consider a discrete-time economy in which agents borrow from a bank and
carry out investments, productions, and consumptions. Hereafter, we call
those agents household productions. They are homogeneous with population
size one. Each household production is risk-averse, and has the following
CRRA type expected utility function at date t:
Et[
∞∑
s=0
βs
c1−σt+s − 1
1− σ ] , (1)
where ct+s is his or her consumption at date t + s, and Et denotes expec-
tations formed at date t. The subjective discount factor β takes the value
between zero and one strictly. σ expresses the degree of relative risk aver-
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sion. These parameters are common to all agents.
Each household production has the following Cobb-Douglas type produc-
tion function:
yt = f(kt−1) = kαt−1 , (2)
where kt−1 is the capital used for production at date t − 1, and yt is the
output (GDP) at date t. α is a capital share relative to the output and lies
between zero and one.
Each household production can borrow from a bank. The amount of the
loan made at date t − 1 and the gross rate of interest at date t − 1 are
denoted by bt−1 and Rt−1, respectively. At date t, he or she consumes ct,
repays Rt−1bt−1, and invests kt−kt−1. Since these expenditures are financed
by the output yt and the new loan bt, each household production faces the
following budget constraint:
f(kt−1) + bt ≥ ct +Rt−1bt−1 + (kt − kt−1) . (3)
All these variables are measured by the consumption goods.
Each household production maximizes expected discounted utility (1) sub-
ject to intertemporal budget constraint (3) and the perfect foresight assump-
tion Et[xt+s] = xt+s:
max
{c,b,k}
: Et[
∞∑
s=0
βsu(ct+s)] =
∞∑
s=0
βs
c1−σt+s − 1
1− σ
s.t. f(kt−1) + bt ≥ ct +Rt−1bt−1 + (kt − kt−1) .
By appealing to the Bellman’s principle of optimality, the solutions are ob-
tained as follows2:
u′(ct−1) = βRt−1u′(ct) or ct = (βRt−1)
1
σ ct−1 , (4)
f ′(kt) = Rt − 1 or kt = (Rt − 1
α
)
1
α−1 , (5)
2Refer to Appendix A for the detailed derivation.
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bt = (βRt−1)
1
σ ct−1 +Rt−1bt−1 + (
Rt − 1
α
)
1
α−1
− (Rt−1 − 1
α
)
1
α−1 − (Rt−1 − 1
α
)
α
α−1 . (6)
Equation (4) claims that he or she makes an optimal consumption choice.
Equation (5) claims that he or she makes an optimal investment choice.
Equation (6) is interpreted as the borrowing-demand function. Equation (6)
is derived by substituting optimal paths (4) and (5) for budget constraint
(3) with equality.
From equations (2) and (5), the optimal output yt can be obtained as
yt = f(kt−1) = kαt−1 = (
Rt−1 − 1
α
)
α
α−1 . (7)
To ensure long-term rationality of household productions, we rule out ex-
ploding bubbles in the gross rate of interest:
lim
s→∞ Et[β
−sRt+s] = 0 . (8)
Before we turn to dynamics, it is useful to look at the steady-state equi-
librium. The steady-state variables should satisfy
R∗ = 1/β ,
k∗ = (
1− β
αβ
)
1
α−1 ,
c∗ = (
β − 1
β
)b∗ + k∗α = (
β − 1
β
)b∗ + (
1− β
αβ
)
α
α−1 ,
y∗ = k∗α = (
1− β
αβ
)
α
α−1 .
Now I consider the dynamics. Since optimal paths (4)-(6) are non-linear,
it is difficult to derive an analytical solution. Then, I analyze this system
by linearizing around the steady state. Denoting the percentage deviation
from the steady state of an optimal path {Xt} as X̂t ≡ (Xt −X∗)/X∗, the
linear approximations of equations (4)-(6) are
ĉt =
1
σ
R̂t−1 + ĉt−1 , (9)
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k̂t = −a1R̂t , (10)
b̂t = a2ĉt−1 +
1
β
b̂t−1 − a1a3R̂t + a4R̂t−1 , (11)
ŷt = −αa1R̂t−1 , (12)
where
a1 ≡ 1(1− α)(1− β) (> 0) , a2 ≡ (
c∗
b∗
) , a3 ≡ (k
∗
b∗
) , a4 ≡ 1
σ
a2 +
1
β
+ a1a3 − 1(α− 1)βa3 .
2.2 The representative bank
The balance sheet identity of a bank at date t is given as
CASHt + Lt = Dt + CAPt , (13)
where CASHt is the amount of cash (riskless assets)3 at date t, Lt is the
amount of loans (risky assets) at date t, Dt is the amount of debts at date
t, and CAPt is the amount of capitals at date t. We assume that the bank
raises funds of debts from the outside perfect financial market. Among these
variables, CASHt and Lt are endogenous variables, and Dt and CAPt are
exogenous variables4.
At date t, the bank aims to maximize its next date profit Πt+1 under
balance sheet identity (13)5:
max
Lt
: Πt+1 = (Rt − 1)Lt − (RDt − 1)Dt − C(FLt, BISt) , (14)
where Rt is the gross rate of interest on the loans from date t to date
t + 1, which is assumed to to be the same as that on the borrowings of
3Actually, banks often hold the government bonds as riskless assets. Here, for simplic-
ity, I assume banks to hold cash as riskless assets.
4In order to focus on the bank lendings, I assume that the amount of debts is exogenous.
5Readers may wonder why the bank does not aim to maximize its profit over the
”infinite” horizons. We have two reasons to adopt the simplified optimization. First, the
dynamic paths become too complicated if we adopt the infinite problem. Second, each
approach yields the similar results.
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the household productions, RDt is the gross rate of interest on the debts
from date t to date t + 1, Ct is the cost function of the bank at date t,
FLt ≡ Lt − Lt−1 is a net increase of the loans from date t − 1 to date t,
and BISt ≡ CAPt/Lt is the bank’s capital ratio at date t. Among these
variables, Rt is an endogenous variable, and RDt is an exogenous variable.
The cost function of the bank at date t, Ct, has two elements: adjustment
costs and credit costs (BIS costs). The bank bears adjustment costs when it
increases new loans (see Ogawa and Kitasaka, 2000, and E.Elyasiani et al.,
1995). The cost function Ct satisfies the following conditions:
∂Ct
∂FLt
> 0 ,
∂2Ct
∂FL2t
≥ 0 .
The bank also incurs a penalty from the financial market when the bank’s
capital ratio becomes smaller. Hereafter, we call this penalty credit costs
(BIS costs) (see Ito and Sasaki, 2000). The cost function Ct also satisfies
the following conditions: 
∂Ct
∂BISt
< 0 ,
∂2Ct
∂BIS2t
≥ 0 .
I specify the cost function Ct, which satisfies the above conditions, as
C(FLt, BISt) = γ0FLt +
γ1
2
FL2t +
γ2
2
1
BIS2t
(γ0, γ1, γ2 > 0) . (15)
The first order condition of this profit maximization problem is
(Rt − 1) = ∂Ct
∂FLt
∂FLt
∂Lt
+
∂Ct
∂BISt
∂BISt
∂Lt
. (16)
Equation (16) claims that the marginal revenue and marginal cost are equal6.
The optimal path is obtained from equation (16) as
Lt =
γ1
γ1 + γ2
CAPt
2
Lt−1 +
1
γ1 + γ2
CAPt
2
Rt − γ0 + 1
γ1 + γ2
CAPt
2
, (17)
6The second order condition,
∂2Πt+1
∂L2
t
≤ 0, is also satisfied.
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which is interpreted as the loan-supply function.
Now, let us consider the dynamics. The linear approximation of the loan-
supply function and the steady-state value of Lt are calculated as follows
respectivley:
L̂t = δ1L̂t−1 + δ2R̂t + δ3ĈAP t , (18)
L∗ =
CAP
∗2
γ2
(
1
β
− 1− γ0) ,
where
δ1 ≡ γ1
γ1 + γ2
CAP
∗2
(< 1) , δ2 ≡ 1
βL∗(γ1 + γ2
CAP
∗2 )
, δ3 ≡ 2γ2
CAP
∗2
γ1 + γ2
.
2.3 The market equilibrium
The market equilibrium condition of the bank loans and borrowings is Lt =
bt, which determins Rt. The linear approximation of the above equation is
L̂t = b̂t, which determins R̂t:
R̂t =
1
δ4
{a2ĉt−1 + ( 1
β
− δ1)b̂t−1 + a4R̂t−1} , (19)
where
δ4 ≡ δ2 + a1a3 (> 0) .
Equation (19) shows that a contemporaneous lending rate of interest de-
pends on the various ”lagged” variables.
3 Tax-financed public funds injection into the bank
In this section, I evaluate the effects of tax-financed public funds injection
on the economy. To examin, I adopt the technique employed in Kiyotaki
and Moor (1997): the injection and taxation are considered as unanticipated
shocks to the steady-state equilibrium, and the response to that impulse is
considered.
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Suppose that the economy is in the steady state in which a bank’s capital
ratio is relatively low. Then, in order to improve the bank’s fragility and
stabilize the financial system, the government collects taxes from the house-
hold productions and injects them into the bank’s capital at date t = T .
The taxes are collected by a lump-sum manner.
1. At date t = T
Each household production pays a lump sum tax τ to the government,
and the government injects them to the bank. Moreover, I assume that the
proportion λ(0 ≤ λ ≤ 1) of the injected public funds are used for the loans,
and the rest 1− λ of those are left as cash. Denoting the ratio of the tax to
the output (GDP) as τ̂(≡ τ/y∗) and noting that X̂T−1 = 0 holds, equations
(9) − (12) and (18) at date t = T become
ĉT = 0 ,
k̂T = −a1R̂T ,
b̂T = −a1a3R̂T + (y
∗
b∗
)τ̂ ,
L̂T = δ2R̂T + δ3ĈAP T + λ(
y∗
L∗
)τ̂ ,
ĈAP T = (
y∗
CAP
∗ )τ̂ .
The percentage deviation of the gross rate of interest at date t = T , R̂T ,
is calculated by the market equilibrium condition bˆT = LˆT . The result is
R̂T =
y∗
δ4
{(1− λ
b∗
)− ( δ3
CAP
∗ )}τ̂ . (20)
The first term (1 − λ)/b∗ expresses the taxation effect: the lending rate of
interest rises at date t = T . The second term (δ3/CAP
∗) is the injection
effect: the lending rate of interest falls at date t = T . The total effect on
the lending rate of interest at date t = T , which is the sum of the first and
second effects, depends on parameters.
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2. At date t ≥ T + 1
Equations (19) − (12) directly apply at date t ≥ T + 1. Equation (18) at
date t ≥ T + 1 becomes
L̂t = δ1L̂t−1 + δ2R̂t + δ3(
y∗
CAP
∗ )τ̂ .
The percentage deviation of the gross rate of interest at date t ≥ T + 1,
R̂t, is calculated by the market equilibrium condition bˆt = Lˆt. The result is
R̂t =
1
δ4
{a2ĉt−1 + ( 1
β
− δ1)b̂t−1 + a4R̂t−1 − δ3( y
∗
CAP
∗ )τ̂} . (21)
4 Simulation
It is too difficult to solve analytically the influences of the public funds
injection on the economy. Thus, we carry out a simulation to show numeri-
cally how the economy developes through time7. In order to carry out the
simulation, we need to determine values of parameters in a model. As the
values of the parameters, I adopt the values compatible with the real econ-
omy and those based on empirical studies.
Six baseline (deep) parameters appear in this model: α, β, γ0, γ1, γ2, λ
and σ. For α(the capital share relative to the output) and β(the subjective
discount rate), Cooley and Prescott (1995) reported α = 0.40 and β = 0.98,
where one period is taken as three months. In this simulation, I adopt these
values and the interval.
For the parameters in the cost function of the bank, the values of γ0 = γ1 =
1.4× 10−2 and γ2 = 3.6× 10−3 imply that ((RD∗− 1)D∗)/C(FL∗, BIS∗) =
(costs of paying the interest on debts)/(adjustment costs + credit costs)=98,
BIS∗(capital ratio) ≡ CAP ∗/L∗= 0.08, RD∗ = 1.00115 9 andD∗+CAP ∗ =
7For the general instructions of the simulation methods, refer to Kawasaki(1999).
8This calibration reflects the fact that about 90 % of the total costs are used for paying
interest on debts in the Japanese banks.
9We take RD
∗
as the average deposit rates from 1995 to 2001 in Japan. As for the
amount and term, I adopt ”no less than 10 million yen” and ”3 months less than 6 months”.
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L∗. We assume λ = 0.5 and σ = 1. Table 1 collects the values of these base-
line (deep) parameters.
When the values of the baseline (deep) parameters in Table 1 are known,
the steady-state values of R∗, k∗ and y∗ can be determined. The results are
R∗ = 1.018, k∗ = 1.7 × 102 and y∗ = 7.8 . The values of CAP ∗=9.4 and
b∗ = L∗ = 1.2× 102 imply that BIS∗(capital ratio) ≡ CAP ∗/L∗=0.08 and
b∗/k∗=0.7 . And, when these values are known, we can calculate the amount
of the consumption in the steady state c∗. The result is c∗ = 5.6. Finally,
we assume that the tax rate in the steady state, τ̂∗ = τ∗/y∗, is 0.02. Table
2 collects the steady-state values of these variables. The values of a1 ∼ a4
and δ1 ∼ δ4 can be calculated from the values in Tables 1 and 2. Table 3
presents the results.
We are now in a position to investigate stability of the dynamics around the
steady state. Using the results of Tables 1 and 3, it can be shown that one
eigenvalue is larger than 1, which corresponds to an explosive path; and that
the other two eigenvalues lie strictly between -1 and 1, which corresponds to
stable paths10. Therefore, this dynamics has a saddle-stable path. We take
the gross rate of interest to be a jump variable so that the dynamic path
Table 1: Values of the baseline (deep) parameters
α β γ0 γ1 γ2 λ σ
0.40 0.98 1.3× 10−2 1.3× 10−2 3.6× 10−3 0.5 1
Table 2: Steady-state values of the variables
R∗ k∗ y∗ b∗(= L∗) c∗ CAP ∗ BIS∗ τ̂∗
1.018 1.7× 102 7.8 1.2× 102 5.6 9.4 0.08 0.02
Table 3: Values of the coefficients
a1 a2 a3 a4 δ1 δ2 δ3 δ4
91.7 4.8× 10−2 1.4 1.3× 102 0.997 0.63 5.9× 10−3 1.3× 102
10Refer to Appendix B for the derivation.
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lies on a two-dimensional stable manifold:
R̂T =
y∗
δ4
{(1− λ
b∗
)− ( δ3
CAP
∗ )}τ̂ + R̂jump ,
where R̂jump is a jump component of R̂T , which is chosen so as to satisfy
the long-term rationality condition (8). Actually, we can find the value of
R̂jump such that R̂T+s converges to some finite value for large s.
Figure 2 shows how the lending rate of interest developes through time.
At the initial date, it jumps upward greatly, which can be understood as
an overshooting phenomenon of the taxation effect. After the initial date,
it gradually falls toward the new steady-state equilibrium, which is about
0.002 % less than the original steady state. One possible explanation of
this gradual decline is that the injection into the bank’s capitals reduces
the credit cost permanently. Fourth term in the R.H.S. of equation (21),
−δ3( y∗
CAP
∗ )τ̂ , captures this effect.
Figure 3 shows how the borrowings develope through time. At the initial
date, they jump downward greatly, which is triggerd by the upward jump of
the lending rate of interest. After the initial date, they gradually increase
toward the new steady-state equilibrium, which exceeds the original steady
state by about 1.0 %.
Figure 4 shows how the outputs (GDP) develope through time. At the
second quarters, they jump downward greatly, which is triggerd by the up-
ward jump of the lending rate of interest. After the second quarters, they
gradually increase toward the new steady-state equilibrium, which exceeds
the original steady state by about 0.8 %.
Figure 5 shows how the capital stocks develope through time. At the initial
date, they jump downward greatly, which is triggerd by the upward jump of
the lending rate of interest. After the initial date, they gradually increase
toward the new steady-state equilibrium, which exceeds the original steady
state by about 0.2 %.
Finally, Figure 6 shows how the consumption developes through time. From
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the initial date to the 40th quarters, the consumption exceeds the original
steady state: the injection improves welfare in some first periods. However,
after the 40th quarters, it gradually decreases toward the new steady-state
equilibrium, which is about 0.25 % less than the original steady state: the
injection rather aggravates welfare in the long term.
The intuition for why this is the case is given by considering equation (9).
The first term 1σ R̂t−1 in the R.H.S. of equation (9) captures the substitution
effect by interest rate fluctuations: when the interest rate at date t − 1,
R̂t−1, rises, an agent finds it profitable to consume more at the next date t
because the gain from tilting its consumption from date t− 1 to date t also
increases. The second term ĉt−1 in the R.H.S. of equation (9) captures the
effect of diminishing maginal utility: when an agent consumes more at date
t, she finds it profitable to consume more at next date t because the utility
gain from consuming more at date t decreases. Therefore, the consumption
fluctuates parallel to the interest rate with some lags.
Putting Figure 5 and 6 together yields another important implications.
From 14th quarters to 40th, the increase of the capital stocks results in
the increase of the consumption: the injection induces efficient investments.
However, after the 40th quarters, the increase of the capital stocks never re-
sults in the increase of the consumption: it induces inefficient investments.
5 Conclusion
I have analyzed how tax-financed public funds injection into banks influ-
ence a macroeconomy. First, I carried out theoretical analyses to derive loan
demand and supply functions from dynamic optimizing problems of house-
holds and banks. Then, I carried out a simulation by using the theoretical
model and the empirically-known parameters. From the simulation, it is
shown that the injection improves welfare in some first periods; however, it
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rather aggravates in the long term. It is also shown that the injection in-
duces efficient investments in some first periods, while, it induces inefficient
investments in the long term. These results have important policy implica-
tions: public funds injection itself can mitigate a systemic risk, however, it
can aggravate welfare and induce inefficient investments in the long term.
Therefore, the government should take these things into consideration when
it carries out public funds injection.
Finally, in the future research, it would be very interesting to discuss to
what extent the public funds injection can mitigate a systemic risk. This
discussion is important when we consider the total quantitative evaluation
of the public funds injection.
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Appendix A: derivation of the optimal paths of the house-
hold production
Under the perfect foresight assumption Et[xt+s] = xt+s, the utility maxi-
mization problem of the household production over infinite terms is
max
{c,b,k}
: Et[
∞∑
s=0
βsu(ct+s)] =
∞∑
s=0
βs
c1−σt+s − 1
1− σ
s.t. f(kt−1) + bt ≥ ct +Rt−1bt−1 + (kt − kt−1) .
This maximization problem over infinite terms can be solved by the Bell-
man’s principle of optimality. First, the variables decided at date t− 1 and
known at date t can be proxied by a state variable ωt at date t. In this
problem, ωt is chosen as
ωt ≡ f(kt−1) + kt−1 −Rt−1bt−1 . (22)
The discounted present value of lifetime utility from date t,
∞∑
s=0
βsu(ct+s),
is determined by ωt, and let V (ωt) denote the value function of this lifetime
utility. Then, the above maximization problem over infinite terms can be re-
duced to a two-period problem with the state variable ωt and value function
V (ωt) (Bellman equation):
V (ωt) = max{ct,bt,kt}
[u(ct) + βV (ωt+1)] (23)
s.t. ωt ≡ f(kt−1) + kt−1 −Rt−1bt−1 = ct + kt − bt . (24)
When ωt+1 in equation (23) is written in terms of ct, bt and kt by using
equation (24) at date t+ 1, the above maximization problem becomes
V (ωt) = max{ct,bt,kt}
[u(ct) + βV (f(kt) + kt −Rtbt)] s.t. Eq.(44) . (25)
Although equation (25) is the maximization problem with respect to three
variables ct, bt and kt, this problem can be reduced to that of two variables
ct and kt by eliminating bt:
V (ωt) = max{ct,kt}
[u(ct) + βV (f(kt) + kt −Rt(ct + kt − ωt))] . (26)
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Hereafter, we use this simplified equation (26).
The first order conditions with respect to ct and kt are obtained as follows
respectively:
u′(ct) + βVω(ωt+1)
∂ωt+1
∂ct
= u′(ct) + βVω(ωt+1)(−Rt) = 0 , (27)
βVω(ωt+1)
∂ωt+1
∂kt
= βVω(ωt+1)(f ′(kt) + 1−Rt) = 0 . (28)
And, the following equation is obtained by differentiating both sides of equa-
tion (26) with respect to ωt (envelope theorem):
Vω(ωt) = βVω(ωt+1)
∂ωt+1
∂ωt
= βVω(ωt+1)Rt . (29)
Substituting Vω(ωt+1) in equation (29) for equation (27) yields u′(ct−1) =
βRt−1u′(ct), which is the same as equation (4). And equation (28) is equiv-
alent to f ′(kt) = Rt − 1, which is the same as equation (5).
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Appendix B: calculating the eigenvalues of the dynamic
system
The independent variables are only ct, Rt and bt. From equations (15),
(27) and (30) together with b̂t = L̂t, the transition equations are surmarized
into the following matrix form: ĉtR̂t
b̂t
 =
 1 1/σ 0a2/δ4 1/δ4(1/β − δ1) a4/δ4
(a2δ2)/δ4 δ1 + δ2/δ4(1/β − δ1) (a4δ2)/δ4

 ĉt−1R̂t−1
b̂t−1
 .
Using the results of Tables 1 and 3, we can calculate the eigenvalues of this
transition matrix. The results are 1.3628, 0.9994 and -0.7321.
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Fig.1.  Lending Attitude of Financial Institutions in Japan
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Fig.2. Dynamics of the Lending Rate of Interest
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Fig.3. Dynamics of the Borrowings
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Fig.4. Dynamics of the Outputs(GDP)
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Fig.5. Dynamics of the Capital Stocks
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Fig.6.  Dynamics of the Consumption
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